Macau has recently experienced a spike in fake betting chips being introduced to tables, according to security sources.
More than 30 of the fakes were found at one casino in one week, suggest the sources. This appears to conflict with the official line usually given by the industry that radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and security printing have all but eliminated the risk posed by counterfeiters.
Part of the problem appears to be that some of the computerised printing technology used by the industry to create back up security features on the chips (such as watermarks readable only under ultraviolet light or machine readable bar codes) is also available to the general public. And the general public includes the criminal fraternity.
Even if criminals manage successfully to counterfeit the watermarks or bar codes on chips, the fakes should in theory still show up in the computerised chip inventory systems at tableside. This is because the fakes will not have RFID tags on board. The likelihood is, however, that any fakes would be introduced direct to the table by someone ‘capping’ a stack of chips (i.e., adding the fake to the top of a stack in the act of betting), or by some other subterfuge such as an accomplice momentarily distracting the dealer and other players.
And with chip fills at Macau’s often busy tables going on left, right and centre, it takes an alert dealer or pit supervisor to spot trouble before the rogue chip gets to the table, at which point the damage has potentially already been done. Another possibility is that there could be collusion between those introducing the fakes at the table and a few individual dealers.
It may be no coincidence that one recent spike in fakes reportedly happened during ‘Golden Week’ – the week-long holiday following China’s National Day at the beginning of October, when the tables are even more rammed with punters than usual.
An obvious option for the industry is to step up the technology arms race to stay ahead of the criminals and introduce even more security features to the chips. But in a high volume betting market such as Macau, even a cost increase of a few cents per betting chip could have major cost implications for the operators. And even then, a system’s weakest point will always be the human beings who operate it—whether that’s the risk of collusion of casino staff and criminals or under pressure table staff failing to stay alert.
Technology allowing bet recognition on tables has already been seen on a trial basis in the market. This can sound either a silent alarm to dealers or an audible alarm to pit supervisors or cage staff if an illegitimate betting chip without the necessary RFID tag is introduced to the actual gaming table surface. There are, however, reportedly some technical issues still to be resolved. Until they are, these issues could impede the wide introduction of table bet recognition equipment on casino floors. They include the fact some applications are vulnerable to interference from radio wave ‘noise’ caused by cell phones and the numerous other wireless consumer communication technologies often carried by casino customers. Issues have been raised about the effects on bet recognition technology caused by a casino floor physically crowded with people. There are also challenges linked especially to high volume betting markets where tall stacks of chips are often used. Tall chip stacks may make it harder for the equipment to ‘read’ the chips at tableside.
Equipment suppliers working in the bet recognition field insist these are relatively minor teething troubles, but floor and security managers say fully effective application of this potentially very useful technology could be five years away, and possibly even ten years off. By then, who knows what new tricks—such as cloning legitimate RFID tags—the criminals will be using?
