The good news from the NagaWorld baccarat scam is that it was detected very quickly. The fraudsters only got away with it for two days, though it still cost the casino USD1.3 million.
The casino’s surveillance team were alerted by the amount of money paid out from one table—well outside the parameters of normal baccarat table hold volatility—and ordered a review of the security camera footage to understand what might be happening. At that point, suspicions arose that a dealer was colluding with one or more players, and the police were called in. A woman dealer confessed to involvement. It was revealed she had been wearing a pinhole camera relaying information about the card sequence to the scam artists.
As analysis of casino frauds and attempted frauds detected around the world shows again and again, it’s usually not a failure of security technology, or even lapses by the security team that causes the problems. It’s the human interaction of the people at the table or the cage where the weak spot is. That’s either because of help from ‘inside’ by a dealer or cage worker or by some kind of distraction or fraud technique perpetrated by crooked players on fellow players and casino staff.
It seems the fraudsters who managed to steal from NagaWorld took advantage of Cambodian hospitality in more ways than one. At NagaWorld, as a courtesy to customers, and to prove that the house is not trying to cheat the players (some irony there) after cards have been shuffled by an electronic shuffling machine at the table, a second manual shuffle by the dealer takes place. The manual shuffle includes a ‘interlocking’ (‘riffle’) shuffle phase during which the face of the cards would have been exposed to the chest area of the dealer (but not to the players) and the card sequence captured by the hidden camera. A further cut of the cards is done (chosen by the player) before the cards go back in the shoe. The crucial phase in the scam was immediately after this, when the players requested ten free games with no bets taken. Based on the results of the ten free games, the fraudsters, assisted by an accomplice analysing the video at a location away from the table, were able to analyse the sequence of the remaining cards in the shoe. That allowed them to predict the results from the remaining cards and to bet accordingly.
That extra human input after auto shuffling seems to have been the weak link in the dealing process, and the crooks ruthlessly exploited it. It’s understood that NagaWorld is now reviewing the use of manual shuffling in light of the uncovered plot.
A NagaWorld source authorised to speak to Inside Asian Gaming explained that the fraudsters had recruited three female dealers—all Cambodian nationals. They were then coached in how to slow down their interlocking shuffle technique just enough for it to be captured on an illicit camera provided by the crooks, but not so much that it would look suspicious to casino surveillance and floor security.
The next step was to issue the dealers with the pinhole camera, which they took turns to wear on their chest during their shift. The pictures filmed during the interlocking shuffle would then be fed—possibly by a wireless link—to an accomplice of the three tableside players. The accomplice would analyse the pictures and alert the tableside players in advance of the result of each coming game. The casino thinks probably this was via SMS mobile phone messages.
Of the three female dealers, two fled and police are still looking for them. The one who was arrested and is now being held in custody allegedly confessed details of the scam method to the national police.
As is often the case in well-organised crime, it’s the accomplices that take the brunt of law enforcement action and the masterminds that prove to be harder to track down. The two players suspected of involvement are Malaysian nationals and are thought to have left the country shortly before or at around the same time the dealer was arrested. Split possibly four ways (plus dealer pay offs), the cash the men won dishonestly isn’t enough to retire on. We’ll keep readers informed if any arrests follow.
NagaWorld authorised a source to speak to Inside Asian Gaming, both to set the record straight on what happened at the Phnom Penh casino, and as a service to the gaming sector to prevent another operator falling victim to such a technique.
The openness shown by NagaWorld in disclosing its own findings and those of the Cambodian national police investigators may carry wider lessons for the industry. Many operators share information on fraud methods privately, but are often unwilling to discuss casino scams in public even after conclusion of any court proceedings—on the assumption it could damage investor confidence and possibly allow other dishonest people to ‘have a go’ or refine existing scams. Inside Asian Gaming questions the soundness of that logic. The more that the public and casino staff are aware that managements are ‘on to them’ and the more involved staff feel in the security process, the slimmer the chance of them being conned or recruited into talking part.
